Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

2-6-1953

Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co.
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co. [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 327.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/327

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Feb. 1953] BETTER :B"'oon MK'l'S. v. AMER. DIS'l'. TELEG. Co. 179
[40 C.2d 179; 253 P.2d 10]

[L. A. No. 22373.

In Bank.

Feb. 6, 1953.]

BETTER FOOD MARKE'fS, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. AMERICAN DISTRIC'l' TELEGRAPH COMpANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[I] Telegraphs. and Telephones-Contracts for Services.-Where
telegraph company agrees with plaintiff's food market, on
receiving burglar alarm at its central station, to send representatives to make arrest and to transmit alarm promptly
to police headquarters, promptness is of the essence of its
obligation and its delay in acting may be an omission to render
the agreed service and a failure of performance of the contract.
[2] !d.-Contracts for Services-Directed Verdict.-In action for
damages resulting from failure of defendant telegraph company installing burglar alarm system in plaintiff's food market properly to perform agreement to transmit alarm signals
to its guards and to police headquarters, it is error to order
judgment for defendant on its motion for a directed verdict
where there is evidence on which it could be found that
plaintiff's loss was the proximate result of defendant's delay
in responding to the alarms, the time and distance factors
indicating that burglar may have been caught had the
police and guards been called to the premises a few minutes
earlier, and that a delay of nine minutes after plaintiff's
safe had been opened permitted his escape.
[3] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties.-A valid agreement may be made for the payment of liquidated damages,
whereas an agreement for the payment of a penalty is invalid.
[ 4] !d.-Liquidated Damages and. Penalties.-Parties are allowed
to contract for liquidated damages if it is necessary to do
so in order that they may know with reasonable certainty
the extent of liability for a breach of the agreement.
[5] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of
Validity of Stipulation.-·Where parties to an agreement for
liquidated damages exercise their business judgment in providing that it is impracticable and extremely difficult to fix
the damages which may result from defendant's failure to

[3] See Cal.Jur., Damages, § 94; Am.Jur., Damages, § 240.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 2.5;
[3, 4, 12, 15] Damages, § 117; [5, 8-11, 16] Damages, § 126; [6]
Damages, §§ 117, 126; [7] Damages, §§ 158, 172; [13] Damages,
§ 120; [14] Actions, § 15.

180

BE'J"rER

FooD JYIKTS. v.

AMER. DIST. TELEG.

Co.

[40 C.2c1

render its service, 8uch a provision is not controlling as to
. the actual difficulty in fixing damagfls, although it is f\ntitled
to some weight.
[6] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provision.-Unless a clause providing for liquidated damages falls
within the provisions of Civ. Code, § 1671, it is invalid;
and except on admitted facts this is generally a question to
be resolved by the trier of fact.
L7] !d.-Burden of Proof and Pleading-Liquidated Damages.·The burden is on the party seeking to rely on a liquidated
damage provision in a contract to plead and prove facts
showing impracticability of fixing actual damage.
[8] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of
Validity of Stipulation.-In determining whether it would be
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage
in a case where the parties have contracted for liquidated
damages, the court should place itself in the position of the
parties at the time the contract was made and should consider the nature of the breaches that might occur and any
consequences that were reasonably foreseeable.
[9] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of
Validity of Stipulation.-Where a trial court finds that it is
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix damages so as to
render provision in contract for payment of certain sum on
breach thereof a provision for liquidated damages rather than
a penalty, but it appears to a reviewing court that from the
nature of the possible detriment the damages could have been
fixed without difficulty, a judgment based on such finding will
be reversed.
[10] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of
Validity of Stipulation.-Whether it was impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix damages so as to make contract
provision for payment of certain sum of money on breach
thereof a provision for liquidated damages, rather than a
penalty, becomes a question of law where the facts are not
in dispute and admit of but a single conclusion.
[11] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of
Validity of Provision.-Where agreement by defendant telegraph company to transmit burglar alarm signals from plaintiff's store to its own guards and to police headquarters contains provision that it is impracticable and extremely difficult
to fix actual damages which might result from failure to
perform such services and that in case of such failure and a
resulting loss the company's damages shall be limited to $50 as
!iquidated damages and not as a penalty, the uncertainties as
to what might have happened if plaintiff's store were entered are so great, and the possibilities of defendant's failure
to perform its obligation are so innumerable, that there is
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no basis for a conclusion that it would have been practicable
or reasonably possible for the parties to fix the probable
damage, and hence such provision is one for liquidated damages as a matter of law.
[12] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provision.-The validity of a clause for liquidated damages requires that the parties to the contract "agree therein upon
an amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of
damages sustained by a breach thereof" ( Civ. Code, § 1671),
and this amount must represent the result of a reasonable
endeavor by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss that may be sustained.
[13] Id.- Liquidated Damages and Penalties- Construction of
Stipulation.--Where impracticability or extreme difficulty in
fixing damages if contract should be breached appears as
a matter of law, and the parties have expressly agreed on
a certain sum as liquidated damages, they did not contract
for a penalty if the actual loss resulting from a breach could
in many cases be less than the amount provided for and could
in many other cases exceed that amount, since to constitute
a penalty the amount provided for would bear no reasonable relation to the losses the parties thought might be sustained.
[14] Actions-Contract or Tort.-Although an action in tort may
sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a contractual duty, still the nature of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be determined by reference to
the contract which created that duty.
[15] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties.-Where the
breach of a duty created only by contract is a negligent one,
the application of a valid clause for liquidated damages may
not be avoided by bringing an action in tort.
[16] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of
Validity of Stipulation.-The validity of a liquidated damage clause in a contract must be determined in accordance
with the facts and circumstances in Pach particular case.

A PPliJA Ij from a j ndgment of the Snperior Court of I1os
.\11g·e.Jrs County. Arthnr Crnm, ,Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Action for damages for breach of contract.

Judgment for

tleff'JI(lant modified and affirmed.

Eug·pue S. Jve;; aud ,John Goddard for Appellant.
Lawler, Felix & Hall, Reed A. Stout and John M. Hall
for Respondent.
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SHENK, ,J.-This is an action brought on counts alleged
in tort and in contract wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages resulting from the alleged failure of the defendants
to properly transmit burglar alarm signals to their own guards
and to the headquarters of the municipal police department.
Such failure is alleged to have permitted a burglar to escape
with the sum of $35,930 taken from the plaintiff's food market.
On the first trial the court granted a motion for nonsuit in
behalf of all the defendants except the .American District Telegraph Company, and ordered judgment for those defendants.
As against the defendant American District Telegraph Company the jury on the first trial found for the plaintiff, but a
new trial was granted on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence. On the second trial the jury was unable to agree
and was dismissed. Thereafter the defendant successfully
moved for a directed verdict pursuant to section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (ordering judgment where motion
for directed verdict should have been, but was not, granted),
and the court ordered judgment for the defendant. On this
appeal taken from that judgment the plaintiff contends that
there is sufficient evidence of the defendant's negligence and
breach of contract to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff, and
that it was error to grant the motion for a directed verdict.
In June of 1947 the parties entered into a written agreement whereby the defendant was to install and maintain itR
standard ''Central Station Burglar Alarm and Holdup System" in the plaintiff's food market. The contract provided
that the defendant "on receipt of a burglar alarm signal
from the Subscriber's [plaintiff's] premises, agrees to send
to said premises, its representatives to act as agent of and
in the interest of the Subscriber. . . . The Subscriber hereby
authorizes and directs the Contractor [defendant] to cause
the arrest of any person or persons unauthorized to enter his
premises and to hold him or them until released by the Subscriber . . . . The Contractor, on receipt of a holdup alarm
signal from the Subscriber's premises, agrees to transmit the
alarm promptly to headquarters of the public police department."
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff on thiR appeal from a judgment on a directed verdict for the defendant, (Anthony v. Hobbie, 25 Cal.2d 814
r155 P.2d 826]) the following facts were established: On
November 16, 1947, at approximately 7 :30 p.m. the assistant
manager of the plaintiff's market set the burglar alarm system
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and locked the building. As he entered his car in the parking
lot he was accosted by an armed robber and at gunpoint
forced to return and open the store, the inner office and the
safe. The robber took the contents of the safe, taped the
assistant manager, and left. Approximately 14 minutes elapsed
between the time when the store was reopened and when the
robber left the store with the loot. During this period signals
were being received at the defendant's central station in(licating the sequence of the opening and closing of the doors.
The defendant's operators at the central station did not call
a guard or inform the police until 7 :51, nine minutes after
the signal indicating that the safe had been opened, was received. The assistant manager had succeeded in knocking a
telephone off the hook and calling for help at approximately
7 :50. The police arrived at the market at 7 :52, within one
minute after receiving a call. The defendant's guards arrived
shortly thereafter. The assistant manager's watch was broken
at the time he was taped and the hands had stopped at 7 :50.
[1] Under the circumstances of this case it would have
been reasonable to conclude that the defendant had a duty to
call the police as well as its own guards to the plaintiff's
premises. Promptness being the essence of the defendant's
obligation, its delay in acting could reasonably be found to
be an omisison to render the agreed service and a failure of
performance of the contract.
[2] There is evidence upon which it could have been
found that the loss was the proximate result of the defendant's
delay in responding to the alarms. There was but one individual committing the burglary. He acted deliberately and
there is reason to believe that the agreement between the
parties was entered into with the intention of providing for
the apprehension of such a person before he left the premises.
The time and distance factors indicate that this particular
burglar may have been caught had the police and guards been
called to the premises a few minutes earlier, and that the
delay of nine minutes after the safe had been opened permitted
the escape. Such probabilities are to be weighed in the light
of common experience in such matters and present a triable
issue of fact. There was substantial evidence from which a
jury could have found that the plaintiff's loss was the proximate result of the defendant's breach of its contract. Therefore
it was error for the trial court to order judgment for the defendant on its motion for a directed verdict.
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There remains the qHcstion of the validity of the following
pnn·isions of thr <·ontrart for liquidated damages: ''It is
agr<'ed by ami betwern the parties that the Contractor is not
an insurer, that t}w payments hereinbefore named are based
solely on the value of the service in the maintenance of the
system described, that it is impracticable and extremely difficult
to fix the actual damages, if any, which may proximately result from a failure to perform such services and in case of
failure to perform such services and a resulting loss its
liability hereunder shall be limited to and fixed at the sum of
fifty dollars as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and
this liability shall be exclusive.''
[3] It is generally recognized that a valid agreement may
be made for the payment of liquidated damages, whereas an
agreement for the payment of a penalty is invalid. [ 4] Under the law generally the parties are allowed to contract for
liquidated damages if it is necessary to do so in order that
they may know with reasonable certainty the extent of liability for a breach of the agreement. [5] Where the parties
exercise their business judgment in providing that it is impracticable and extremely difficult to fix the damages which
may result from the defendant's failure. to render its service
such a provision is not controlling as to the actual difficulty
in fixing damag·es, although it is entitled to some weight.
(See Sta1·k v. Shemada, 187 Cal. 785, 788 [204 P. 214]; Dyer
Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. Central Iron Works, 182
Cal. 588, 592 [189 P. 445] ; see, also, Restatement of Contracts,
§ 339(f), p. 544.)
The statutory law and its interpretation in this state are
in accord with the general law. Civil Code section 1670 states
that a provision in a contract which provides for the amount
of dnmages to be paid in the event of a breach of the contract
is void, except as expressly provided in section 1671 as follows:
''The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount
which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case,
it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the
actual damage." [6] Unless a clause providing for liquidated damages falls within the provisions of section 1671 it
is invalid (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Wo1·ks v. Central
Iron Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588, 593; Long Beach City School
Dist. v. Dodge, 135 Cal. 401, 405 [67 P. 499]); and except on
admitted facts this is generally a question to be resolved by
the trier of fact (Rice v. Schrnicl, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385 [115 P.2d
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498, 138 A.L.R. 589] ; Petrovich v. City of Arcadia, 36 Cal.2d
78, 86 [222 P.2d 231]; Dyer Br·os. Golden West Iron Works
v. Central Iron Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588, 593). [7] It is
settled law that the burden is on the party seeking to rely
11pon a liquidated damage provision in a contract to plead and
proYe facts showing impracticability (Rice v. Schmid, supr·a,
18 Cal.2d 382, 385; Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works v.
(; entral I ron Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588, 593).
'rhe plaintiff argues that there is no difficulty in the present
ease in fixing the actual damage and that the amount of money
stolen should be the actual damage. Its contention is that
the time for the determination of the question of the impracticability and difficulty in fixing the damages is after
the loss has occurred. This is not the rule. [8] In determining this question the court should place itself in the position
of the parties at the time the contract was made and should
eonsider the nature of the breaches that might oecur and any
('omwquences that were reasonably foreseeable. In Hanlon
Drydock Etc. Co. v. McNear, Inc., 70 Cal.App. 204 [232 P.
1002] (relying on Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110,
120 [27 P. 36, 25 1\m.St.Rep. 102]) the court, in dealing
with the question presented by the plaintiff's contention,
stated at page 211: ''If adopted it would practically destroy
the power given contracting parties under section 1671 of
the Civil Code in any case to make a binding agreement as to
stipulated damages. . . . Appellant's theory is manifestly
contrary to authorities of other jurisdietions, notably the federal jurisdiction; it finds no support in the text-books so far
as our attention has been calJed and if inference may be indulged in, we think the cases of the local jurisdiction clearly
indicate that there is no intention to depart from the universal
rnle established elsewhere." The court cited numerous
anthoritirs supporting the general proposition quoted from
New Brita£n v. New Br£tain Tel. Co., 74 Conn. 326 )50 A.
R81, 884, 1015): "It is the look forward and not backward.
that we are ealled upon to take." This rule is too well settled
to admit of further discussion.
h1 the pre,;ent eaKf' thcr·e was no finding with respeet to
tlu• impradieability or extreme difficulty in fixing· damages.
(9] Where a trial (·ourt does find that sueh a situation did
exifit but it appears to a reviewing court that from the nature
()f the possible detriment the damages could have been fixed
without difficulty, a judgment based on the finding will be
reversed (Stark v. Shemada, supra, 187 Cal. 785). [10] rrhe
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question becomes one of law where the facts are not in dispute
and admit of but a single conclusion. Such is the present
case. [11] When the uncertainties as to what might have
happened if the plaintiff's store were entered is viewed from
the position of the contracting parties, it satisfactorily appears that there is no basis whatever for a conclusion that it
would have been practicable or reasonably possible for the
parties to fix the probable damage. The question, upon the
admitted facts, is clearly one of law.
'rhe possibilities of the consequences of a failure of the
dPfendant to perform its obligation nuder the contract are
innumerable. A failure to receive the signals, or to respond
to them, or to report them to the plaintiff would be a violation of the agreement. Entrances to the building after working hours might be made by persons having authority as
well as by burglars or by persons bent upon mischief. They
migbt or might not cause damage. There might be the theft
of a ham, or of a truckload of goods, or the contents of a safe.
There might be a breaking in for the purpose of theft and no
theft. If money was taken it might be a few dollars or many
thousands. Books might be tampered with, or papers abstracted. Damage might be caused in many ways that were
not foreseeable. In short, it was extremely difficult to predict
the nature and extent of the loss. Furthermore, there was
no way of ascertaining what portion of any loss sustained
could be attributed to the defendant's failure to perform.
The contra·ct specifically provided that the defendant was not
an insurer. Therefore, if it should have fully performed on
the contract and a loss resulted nevertheless it could in no way
be liable. The parties recognize, then, that losses might have
resulted which were not causally connected with the defendant's failure of performance. Where there had been a
failure of performance and a loss, what part of that loss
<·ould be attributed to the failure of performance; or how
much of that losR would have resulted had there not been a
failure of performance~ Under the complexity of the circumstances in this case the parties could not answer this
question. There being no reasonable basis upon which to
predict the nature and extent of any loss, or how much of that
loss the defendant's failure of performance might account for,
it is certain that it would have been ''impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage" (Civ. Code, § 1671).
[12] The validity of a clause for liquidated damages requires that the parties to the contract ''agree therein upon an
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amoimt whi(•b slwJl he presume<l to be the amount of damages
sustairwd by a breach thereof . . . " ( Civ. Code, § 1671.) This
amount must represent the result of a reasonable endeavor
by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for
any loss that may be sustained. (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron
Works v. Central Iron Works, supm, 182 Cal. 588; Rice v.
Schmid, supt·a, 18 Cal.2d 382, 386; Restatement, Contracts,
§ 339, p. 554.) It has been suggested that the greater the
difficulty encountered by the parties in estimating the damages
which might arise from a breach, the greater should be the
range of estimates which the courts should uphold as reasonable. (5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1059, p. 291.) The plaintiff's
contention that the agreed amount did not represent an endeavor by the parties to estimate the probable damage is based
on evidence that the liquidation clause was part of the printed
material in a form contract generally used by the defendant
in dealing with subscribers such as the plaintiff, and that
the defendant did not investigate the plaintiff's manner of
conducting its business or the character and value of its stock.
Nevertheless the parties agreed to the liquidation provisions,
and there is no evidence that they were not fully aware of
circumstances making it desirable that liquidated damages be
provided for.
ln the present case the impracticability or extreme difficulty
in fixing actual damages appeared as a matter of law. In
the exercise of their business judgment the parties reasonably
agreed that in all cases of breach by the defendant the damages would be tix(ed at $50 whether in fact the defendant's
loss for a given breach was greater or less than that amount.
As previously stated the stipulation that the amount was
to be paid "as liquidated damages and not as a penalty"
while entitled to some weight is not conclusive. [13] Nevertheless, it is elear that the actual loss resulting from a breach
eould in many eases be less than the amount provided for.
Tt is equally dear that in many other cases the actual loss
would exceed that amount. To construe this as a penalty it
would have to be said that the amount provided to be paid
bore no reasonable relation to the losses the parties thought
might be sustained. This may not rightly be stated.
'rhe plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the liquidation
elause on the g-round that it has no application to a tort action.
However, the plaintiff makes no claim that a duty was owed
to it outsidf' of that crf'ated by the contract, and no breach of
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du1y \Ht;.: allf'gc•d otlwr than a failure to rendf'r tlw eontraetPd
fc,r srt·Yi<•e. [14] Although an aetion in tort may somf'times
Jw bt·ought for the nPgligt>nt breach of a contractual duty
(Jones v. ]{ cfly, 20:-1 Cal. 251 J280 P. 942 J), still the nature
of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be
determined by reference to the contract which created that
duty. In the present case the duty created by the contract
was one for whieh liability for a breach thereunder was fixed,
and whether the action is brought in tort or in contract the
nature of the duty remains the same. [15] The plaintiff cites
no authority and none has been discovered to the effect that
where the breach of a duty created only by contract is a
negligent one the application of a valid clause for liquidated
damages may be avoided by bringing an action in tort.
The plaintiff relies upon a number of cases holding that
agreements purporting to be for liquidated damages were
in fact agreements for penalties. (Pacific Factor Co. v. A.dler,
supra, 90 Cal. llO; StaTk v. Shemada, SUJJra, 187 Cal. 785;
Rice v. Schmid, supra, 18 Cal.2d 382; RobeTt Marsh & Co.,
Inc., v. Tremper·, 210 Cal. 572 [292 P. 950] ; Eva v. McJJiahon,
77 Cal. 467 [19 P. 872] ; Sherman v. Gray, 11 Cal.App. 348
J104 P. 1004].) [16] The validity of a liquidation clause in a
eontract must be determined in accordance with the facts and
eircumstances of each particular case. The factual situations
in the eases relied upon make them inapplicable to the present
c~asP. As a group they are distinguishable upon the ground
that in each there were factors which would permit the parties
to fairly estimate actual damages in the event of a breachas a predetermined amount for every item of merchandise an
obligor failed to deliver. There was no inherent uncertainty
as to the amount of loss that could be sustained, as in the
present case. The function of the agreed sum in each of those
eases vvas to insure performance by the obligor and was propr•r·ly held to be a penalty.
'!'he order directing a verdict for the defendants involved
questions of fact which could have been found in the plaintiff's
favor. However, the error warrants only a qualified reversal
of the judgment, as the plaintiff's recovery is limited to $50 if
he should prevail on a retrial.
The judgment of the trial court is modified to provide
as follows: "It is ordered, adjndg·ed and decreed that plaintiff rPPover from the r1efendant, American District 'l'elegraph
Company. the snm of $i"i0.00 without costs." As so modified
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the judgment is affirmed.
eosts on appeal.

Each party shall bear its own

Gib~:;on, C. J., Edmonds, ,J ., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., and
Spence, J., concurred.

CAWl'ER, J.--I dissent.
'l'his court holds the following provisiOn a valid eontraet
for liquidated damages: "It is agreed by and betwt~en the
parties that the Contractor [defendant] is not an insurer,
that tlte payments hereinbefore named are based solely on the
'l•aluc of the service in maintenance of the system described,
that it is irwpmcticable and exkemely difficult to fix the
actual damages, if any, which may proximately result fn;m a
failure to perform such services and in case of failtlre to
?Jcrform Stlch services and a resulting loss its l1:ability hereunder shall be limited to and fixed at the sum of fifty dollars
as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and this liability
shall be exclusive." (Emphasis added.)
It is conceded that defendant failed to perform its duty:
that plaintiff's loss resulted therefrom; that plaintiff's loss
was the sum of $35,930 which was taken, by a burglar, from
plaintiff's food market.
In order to uphold the so-called $50 liquidated damage
provision, it was necessary for the majority to find that damages were "impracticable or extremely difficult" to fix at the
time the contract was entered into, and further that the $50
provision bore a reasonable relation to any loss which the
parties contemplatrd might be sustained as a result of a breach
of the contract.
It is said in the majority opinion that ''In determining th iR
question l the losses which might be expected to occur] the
eonrt should place itself in the position of the parties at the
tinH' thr eontract was made and should consider the natm·r•
of 1h(• breaehrs that might occur and any consequences that
wen• reasonably foreseeable." Placing myself in the position
of tlw parties at the time the contract was entered into. T
wonld say that one way of ascertaining the loss which might
occur, was to take an average of the amount of cash left in the
safe in tlw stol'e oveJ·nig,ht; an inventory of the averag·e merdw.ndise kept in the store. If the losses sustained did not
approximatr the damages providrd for by the parties. th~e
rule set forth in Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224
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l50 S.Ct. 142, 74 L.Ed. 382], would be applicable. There the
parties provided for excessive liquidated damages, and the
Supreme Court held that the damages provided for in the
contract bore no reasonable relation to the probable loss to be
sustained and held the provision a penalty and therefore unenforceable. It is the rule that the validity of the provision
must be proved by the one seeking to enforce it. And as is
said in the majority opinion ''Where a trial court does find
that such a situation did exist [impracticability or extreme
difficulty in fixing damages] but it appears to a reviewing
court that from the nature of the possible detriment the damag·es could have been fixed without difficulty, a judgment
based on the finding will be reversed (Stark v. Shemada,
supra, 187 CaL 785)."
It is also said in the majority opinion that "The question
becomes one of law where the facts are not in dispute and
admit of but a single conclusion." Even if the facts are not
in dispute, they seldom admit of but one conclusion. In this
ease, one jury found for plaintiff and the second jury disagreed. Does this not prove that these facts admit of more
than one conclusion? I think it does. It is also said here
that whether damages are impracticable, or extremely difficult,
to fix is ''except on admitted facts . . . generally a question
to be resolved by the trier of fact . . . . '' In Rice v. Schmid,
18 Cal.2d 382 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 589] (the latest pronouncement of this court on this subject), it was held that in
"each instance" it was a question of fact. Further, even on
admitted facts, more than one inference can be, and is often,
drawn. (See Black v. Black, 91 Cal.App.2d 328 [204 P.2d
950] [stipulated facts; different inferences possible] ; Crisman v. Lanterman, 149 Cal. 647 [87 P. 89, 117 Am.St.Rep.
167] [agreed statement of facts; different inferences possible l; Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50 [172 P.2d 533]
/evidence not conflicting; conflicting inferences therefrom
possible]; Rench v. McMullen, 82 Cal.App.2d 872 [187 P.2d
J 11] jonly documentary evidence offered was subject to conflicting inferences] . ) Again, this court goes to great lengths
to uphold the validity of a provision such as this. Note the
"possibilities" which it considers might have happened from
a failure of the burglar detection system. It is said that
''Entrances to the building after working hours might be
made by persons having authority as well as by burglars or
by persons bent on mischief. They might or might not cans~
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damage. There might be the theft of a ham, or of a truekload
of goods, or the (~ontents of a safe. There might be a breaking
iu for the purpose of theft and no theft. If money was taken
it might be a few dollars or many thousands. Books might be
tampered with, or papers abstracted. Damage might be caused
iu many ways that were not foreseeable." If persons having
autlwrity to enter did so, plaintiff would, in all probability,
not have sued the defendant, or, if it had done so, that would
have been a matter of defense at the trial. If a ham had been
stolen, the provision for $50 in all probability, would have been
held a penalty as disproportionate to the loss involved. These
same arguments apply to the balance of the ''reasoning'' of the
majority.
It is also necessary that the amount agreed upon by the
parties ''represent the result of a reasonable endeavor by the
parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss
that may be sustained. (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works
v. Central lt'on Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588; Rice v. Schmid,
supra, 18 Cal.2d 382, 386; Restatement, Contracts, § 339, p.
554.) '' In other words, the amount agreed upon must bear
some reasonable relation to the losses which might occur as a
result of a breach. In my opinion, the $50 provision bears no
reasonable relation to any amount which might have been lost
by a failure of the system to operate.
'l'he characteristic feature of a penalty is that it bears
no relation to the actual damage which may be caused by a
breach, but is arbitrarily fixed without any attempt to estimate the amount of injury. (8 Cal.Jur. 847.) The majority
admits that the validity of a liquidation clause in a contract
must be determined in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each particular case, but distinguishes the following cases: Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110 [27 P. 36,
25 Am.St.Rep. 102], Stark v. Shemada, 187 Cal. 785 [204 P.
214], Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R.
589], Robert Mar-sh & Co., Inc. v. Tremper, 210 Cal. 572
1292 P. 950], Eva v. McMahon, 77 Cal. 467 [19 P. 872],
8her·man v. Gray, 11 Cal.App. 348 [104 P. 1004], on the
ground that ''in each there were factors which would permit
the parties to fairly estimate actual damages in the event of a
breach-as a predetermined amount for every item of merchandise an obligor failed to deliver," and that "The function
of the agreed sum in each of those cases was to insure performance by the obligor and was properly held to be a
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JWnalty." I find no diRtingui,hing features. It appears to
l!H-• that tl1P $fi0 provisiou hf're might just as well be held to
be a rwnalty iu tlw eYent of nonperformanee by the defendant,
and that it eert11inly bPars no reasonable relation to the losses
which the parties had in eontemplation.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial
eourt to rt>try the ease and submit the issue of damages to
the jnry.
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IIAI_j lVI. ATKINSON et al., Respondents, v. PACIFIC FIRE
EXTINGUISHER COMPANY, Appellant.
[l] Contracts-Performance-Waiver of Breach.-Where contract

by which defendant company installed fire detection system
in plaintiffs' planing mill provides for an annual rental payable in monthly installments, defendant's acceptance of overdue payments constitutes a waiver of strict compliance by
plaintiffs.
[2a, 2b] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of Validity of Stipulation.-Provision in contract that
in case of failure of fire detection system installed by defendant company in plaintiffs' planing mill to perform detection
service and a resulting loss the company's liability shall be limited to $25 as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, is
a valid provision for liquidated damages where the parties
had no way of knowing what type of fire might occur after
a particular failure of the detection system and could not
have predicted what portion of the loss in any particular
fire would be the proximate result of failure of such system,
and where the uncertain extent to which losses might occur,
viewed from the time of entering into the contract, would
make the task of fixing damages an extremely difficult if not
an impossible one.
[3] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provision.-One who relies on a clause for liquidated damages in a
contract must show that the parties to the contract "agree
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the
amount of damages sustained by a breach- thereof." ( Civ.
Code, § 1671.)

[3] See Cal.Jur., Damages, § 94; Am.Jur., Damages, § 240.
McK. Dig. References: [1 J Contracts, § 248; [2, 6] Damages,
§ 126; [3, 4] Damages, § 117; [5] Damages, § 120.

